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Surveying the Social:
Techniques, Practices, Power
BRUCE CURTIS*
The varying senses in which nineteenth- and twentieth-century social thought and
policy constructed and came to grips with “the social’ and “society” are discussed.
Social history and historical sociology both need these concepts and need to be crit-
ical of them.
Il est ici question des diverses façons dont la pensée et la politique sociales des dix-
neuvième et vingtième siècles ont construit et appréhendé le « social » et la
« société ». L’histoire sociale et la sociologie historique ont toutes deux besoin de
ces concepts et doivent demeurer critiques à leur égard.
THE SOCIAL, which forms the object of the essays in this collection, has
had a curious and curiously truncated career over the last three decades. We
learned about its invention, genesis, and rise in the Foucauldian litera-
ture of the 1970s and 1980s. In the early parts of the following decade, it was
written, governed, mapped, played, undone, and separated from
the self.1 It seemed to be about to go forth and multiply in the 1990s, yet
there are now increasing suggestions that the social is dying, or is dead, or
never was in the first place. Such a state of affairs is seen as a source of angst,
optimism, or political danger depending upon who is writing and upon just
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what the social is held to mean and to do. Historians and sociologists pon-
der the question of the forms which might be taken by a post-social history
and a sociology after society.
The essays in this collection contribute to such reflection by examining
aspects of the historical development of the social. Drawing on a range of
conceptual resources, our histories are meant to reveal some of the processes
and practices of construction that sustain modern claims to know things
about the world and to know to intervene in it. We treat the social as both
fact and artefact. It is an artefact of the ways of knowing and administering
human relations characteristic of what comes to be called the social sci-
ence. Its factual character is evident as such ways of knowing and adminis-
tering realized in investigative instruments, in techniques of representation,
and in the policies and practices of public and private governmental agen-
cies. The social is a relational and mobile political form. It usually operates
silently in the background of the writing of history and sociology, but, as
Denise Riley aptly remarked, once the seemingly neutral and vacant back-
drop of the social presents itself for scrutiny, it appears as a strange phe-
nomenon in its own right.2
The ongoing intellectual hubub about the social has taken place without
the object in question even registering as a substantive in linguistic usage,
beyond the confines of a narrow segment of the academy. Lodged in a list
that opens with sociable and ends with sociometry in the Oxford English
Dictionary, social works as a remarkably pliable and congenial adjective.
In addition to its connections with history and science, social happily mod-
ifies and specifies contract, credit, democrat, disease (venereal),
evil (prostitution), order, realism, security, service, and worker.
The OED does offer social climber and social secretary, which hint at a
substantive  something one could surmount or organize. But the dictionary
quickly forecloses such a line of investigation by defining social phenomena
in terms of either society or the state. Social services are state-pro-
vided welfare services and social climbers attempt to ascend societys
ranks. While the state is defined as an organized political community,
society is either a social mode of life (in a civilized nation and thus, by
implication, life under a state) or a social community. Society is social,
social is society, and both seem somehow to be subsumed to the state as an
organized political community.
Elliptical meanings and self-referential concepts can be seen to indicate
areas of theoretical confusion, of the taken-for-granted (try writing your his-
tory or sociology without invoking the adjective social!), or of the ideo-
logical in epistemological usage. The contributors to this collection propose
that some clarification of such ellipsis and self-referentiality can be found by
investigating the concrete historical practices of knowledge production and
administration  the techniques, routines, rituals, and instruments  that
2 Denise Riley, Am I That Name? Feminism and the Category of “Women” in History (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1988), p. 49.
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sustain political claims to know something and that underpin capacities for
practical intervention. We see the social as a product of practices, con-
flicts, and struggles which encouraged the emergence and solidification of a
domain of knowledge, of a field for the exercise of power, and of an object
of political administration. The social, however, is mobile, and topographi-
cal imagery in relation to it is potentially misleading.
The artefactual character of the social  that it is a product of projects,
practices, and techniques which equate and unify empirically disparate
objects and relations  in no way prevents it from being an object of human
activity. Yet there is no essential thing that is the social. Its objective charac-
ter results from the ongoing work that is done to objectify it; we investigate
some of that work here. As Riley put it eloquently:
The nineteenth-century social is the reiterated sum of progressive philan-
thropies, theories of class, of poverty, of degeneration; studies of the domestic
lives of workers, their housing, hygiene, morality, mortality; of their exploita-
tion, or their need for protection, as this bore on their family lives too. It is a
blurred ground between the old public and private, voiced as a field for inter-
vention, love, and reform by socialists, conservatives, radicals, liberals, and
feminists in their different and conjoined ways.3
As the quotation suggests, there are many possible histories of the social
that could be written and, in fact, in contemporary discussion, the social is
invoked to refer to rather different things. By way of introduction to our col-
lection, I flag a number of important and, to some extent, overlapping lines
of enquiry. One of these concerns the preoccupation of Foucauldian writers
with the social as an instrument of governmentality. Here, debate about the
social emerged out of reflection on the origins and fate of the welfare state.
The history of this social concerns the undermining of a liberal diagram of
power, and the programmes associated with it, through the construction of
solidarities by administrative means. In turn, Nikolas Roses speculations on
the death of the social or Mitchell Deans discussion of the end of soci-
ety might seem to refer to the displacement of government through solidar-
ity by other techniques and finalities. Insurance technologies, for instance,
which based solidarities on an equalization of risks, are seen to retreat in
some sectors before prudentialism, under which individuals are made
responsible for their own risk factors. Administrative policies more gener-
ally may cease to be justified in terms of the good of society or the public
interest. Instead, such individualizing justifications as efficiency, com-
petitiveness, or freedom may be invoked.4
3 Ibid., p. 49; see also Paul Hirst, The Genesis of the Social, Politics and Power, vol. 3 (1981).
4 Mitchell Dean, Sociology After Society in David Owen, ed., Sociology After Postmodernism (Lon-
don: Sage, 1997), pp. 205228; François Ewald, L’État providence (Paris: Grasset, 1986); Pat OMal-
ley, Risk and Responsibilityin Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne and Nikolas Rose, eds., Foucault
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A second and overlapping line of enquiry also sees the social as a domain
or field, usually within the confines of the nation. But literatures concerned
with the history of the social science, of statistics, and of political adminis-
tration emphasize the ways in which the social issues from a productive
spiral of direct organization, classification, observation, recording, theoreti-
cal abstraction, and intervention (not necessarily in that order). A history of
this social focuses on practices of observation that produce new objects of
knowledge, things which hold together, such as rates of crime or divorce or
insanity or poverty.5 It attends to the techniques of representation, especially
numerical and statistical techniques, that make it possible to abstract regular-
ities from hopelessly complex and variegated empirical contexts  or to
posit the existence of such regularities. The potential here is for the discovery
of effects of structure, although, as Mary Poovey has remarked, the work of
abstraction may be more or less gestural. Numerical and related techniques
of representation have sustained claims to scientific authority, even when
numbers and tables have been used in a decorative fashion.6
There are common infrastructural conditions for the execution of the
large-scale, more or less systematic observations, which are at the root of the
social science, as for the administration of the welfare state. Social scientific
development and state administration are closely linked, which is not to say
they are identical. Still, for theoretical appropriation as for practical adminis-
tration, empirical individuals, potentially infinite in their variation, must be
rendered equivalent, at least within relevant categories and classes. They
must also be situated, located, and identified  not least for the mundane
reason that the determination of entitlements, the delivery of services, and
the levying of sanctions demand it.7 Rendering human subjects equivalent
and making such constructed equivalence a grounds for the determination of
life chances is commonly an expression of state sovereignty, of greater or
lesser legal, military, fiscal, and political coercion. Social science and state
administration both involve identifying practices. A corollary has been that
and Political Reason (London: UCL Press, 1996), pp. 189207; Nikolas Rose, The Death of the
Social? Re-figuring the Territory of Government, Economy and Society, vol. 25, no. 3 (1996), pp.
327356, and Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999).
5 Alain Desrosières, Discuter lindiscutable. Raison statistique et espace public in Alain Cottereau
and Paul Ladrière, eds., Pouvoir et légitimité : figures de l’espace public (Paris: École des Hautes
Études en Sciences Sociales, 1992), pp. 131154; How to Make Things Which Hold Together:
Social Science, Statistics and the State in P. Wagner, B. Wittrock, and R. Whitley, eds., Discourses
on Society: The Shaping of the Social Science Disciplines (Dordrecht, 1991), pp. 195218; and His-
toire de formes : statistiques et sciences sociales avant 1940, Revue française de sociologie, vol. 26
(1985), pp. 277310.
6 Mary Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth and
Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).
7 Jane Caplan and John Torpey, eds., Documenting Individual Identity: The Development of State Prac-
tices in the Modern World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
Surveying the Social: Techniques, Practices, Power 87
debates over the social have also tended to be debates about the state,
although we do not take these up here.8
Finally, I point briefly to some work of the last two decades which aims to
deconstruct the social and society as the ground upon which the social sci-
ences in general and sociology in particular claim to base explanations.
Those involved in this work often describe themselves as promoting a mate-
rialist semiotics; some of them are situated in the burgeoning field of sci-
ence studies. Generally speaking, such work attempts to take on board the
proposition that representational practices intermingle in effective ways with
objects of representation. Deconstructionist work and science studies have
dealt what may prove to be a lethal blow to another way of conceiving of the
social: the view that treats it essentially as a domain of human meaning, in
contradistinction to a non-human sphere of nature. In much earlier theoretical
work in sociology (consider both Talcott Parsons and Max Weber, for
instance), social phenomena are by definition those concerned with meaning.
Such sociology posits a more or less sharp divide between the variety of cul-
ture and the supposed invariance of nature, or between cultural understand-
ings and material relations. A similar set of binaries also characterizes much
social history, including varieties of cultural Marxism that seek to juxta-
pose objective material conditions with the contingent, meaning-giving expe-
rience of them by social classes. Science studies make a strong argument for
the co-constitution of society and nature, and other recent work attempts to
overcome the subject/object divide implicit in defining the social as the
meaningful. Yet deconstructionist work risks foreclosing an analysis of
effects of structure.
8 For some relevant material, see Philip Abrams, Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State, Jour-
nal of Historical Sociology, vol. 1, no. 1 (1988), pp. 5889; C. A. Bayly, Empire & Information: Intel-
ligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780–1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996); R. W. Connell, The State, Gender, and Sexual Politics, Theory and Society,
vol. 19 (1990), pp. 507544; Bruce Curtis, Taking the State Back Out: Rose and Miller on Political
Power, British Journal of Sociology, vol. 46, no. 4 (1995), pp. 575597; Mitchell Dean,  A Social
Structure of Many Souls: Moral Regulation, Government, and Self-Formation, Canadian Journal
of Sociology, vol. 19, no. 2 (1994), pp. 145168; Bob Jessop, Narrating the Future of the National
Economy and the National State: Remarks on Remapping Regulation and Reinventing Governance
in George Steinmetz, ed., State/Culture: State Formation After the Cultural Turn (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1999), pp. 378405; Timothy Mitchell, Society, Economy and the State Effect in
Steinmetz, ed., State/Culture, pp. 7697; Mark Neocleous, Administering Civil Society: Towards a
Theory of State Power (London: Macmillan, 1996); Slyvana Patriarca, Statistical Nation Building
and the Consolidation of Regions in Italy, Social Science History, vol. 18 (1994), pp. 359376; N.
Rose and P. Miller, Political Power Beyond the State: Problematics of Government, British Journal
of Sociology, vol. 43, no. 2 (1992), pp. 173205; James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain
Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). It
is also worth noticing Bourdieus observation that critical analysis of the state faces the challenge of
trying to think about the state outside the categories of thought established through state practices.
See Pierre Bourdieu, Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field in Stein-
metz, ed., State/Culture, pp. 5375.
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I outline some dimensions of these approaches to the social in what follows.
My aim is not to be either exhaustive or definitive, but rather to share some of
the lines of enquiry that may make it easier for readers to engage with the
essays in our collection.
Two especially influential works in the Foucauldian literature on the
social have been Jacques Donzelots (selectively translated) L’invention du
social. Essai sur le déclin des passions politiques (1984) and the more ambi-
tious L’État providence (1986) by François Ewald. As his subtitle suggests,
Donzelots work was preoccupied with explaining how the achievements of
the postwar welfare state in France undermined the very political energies
and imagination that presided at their creation. His account of the inven-
tion of the social has attracted relatively little attention in the English-lan-
guage literature, which has been more interested in his discussion of how
notions like society and the social were subsequently mobilized in dis-
cursive practice.
Donzelot claimed the social was invented to resolve a foundational politi-
cal trauma experienced by republican government in France following the
revolution of 1848.9 The achievement of the republic brought to the fore the
irreconcilable opposition between the universal rights of citizens and the
property rights of capitalists. The attempt of the republican assembly to
extend civil rights to include the right to work menaced the right to individ-
ual private property. After his coup détat, Louis Napoleons authoritarian
Second Empire sustained capitalist property relations, but could not deal
effectively with what was already well established as the social question:
the conditions of reproduction of the working class under savage capitalism.
Socialist revolution continued to loom, as the experience of the Paris Com-
mune demonstrated convincingly.
Donzelot signals the special importance of Émile Durkheims theoretical
work in articulating a third way in the 1880s and 1890s. This work por-
trayed the republic as a form of political association characterized by mutual
dependence and solidarity based on the division of labour. Solidarity
was conceived as a moral order under which both savage capitalism and
socialist appropriation would be kept at bay through the enforcement, by the
state, of clear normative limits to capitalist exploitation and labour market
competition. Durkheim advocated the resuscitation and adaptation of an ear-
lier (idealized) guild-like corporatism as a practical means of overcoming the
twin threats of unbridled individualism and unlimited state regulation. Soli-
darity, in other words, could be seen in topographic terms, as a domain,
9 Donzelot, L’invention du social, p. 14. So far, the argument that we should read history as psycho-
analysis has escaped translation, although the work is frequently cited by English-language partici-
pants in the approach known as history of the present. Donzelot saw his project as focused on the
historical psychoanalysis of our relation to the political, which follows the dream of just and har-
monious order and which dissolves in the procedural logic of the social, and on the political psycho-
analysis of our history, which deals with the attempted solutions to the contradictions revealed upon
the birth of the Republic. Since English-language history of the present eschews any hermeneutics
of depth, it is rather surprising that Donzelot appeals to its partisans.
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space, or territory mapped onto individual life and the family on the one
hand, and onto the economy and state relations on the other: the space of the
social. Such a reading of Durkheim allows Donzelot to analyse the social
as an element in the formation of the twentieth-century welfare state.10
Donzelots earlier work, The Policing of Families, focused on the transfor-
mation of the family in nineteenth-century France into an instrument of policy
through the intersection of a diversity of forces: nascent feminism, capitalist
transformation of the conditions of labour, and rising medical expertise,
among others.11 In his less grounded account of solidarity in L’invention du
social, the work of producing the social was conducted by the translation of
Durkheimian theoretical postulates into policy initiatives. The key interven-
tion was the extension of the techniques of insurance to the matter of unem-
ployment. Yet Donzelot did not discuss any dimensions of the development
of the social before Durkheim, nor offer any account of how Durkheims
analysis might have been tied to existing projects for objectifying a social
domain  projects of instrumentation, for instance. Donzelot took the tech-
niques of insurance, through which solidarity was realized, as given.
The work has thus justly been subjected to criticism. It has been suggested
that Donzelot casts the problem of the social at a level of abstraction in which
political tensions are worked out in theoretical texts. As George Steinmetz
has remarked, the effects of social policy are deduced from the text of con-
temporary laws and theoretical descriptions, and indeed it does appear in
Donzelots analysis as if the social were in large part the work of
Durkheims genius made into law. More seriously, as an account of the wel-
fare state, the focus on social insurance draws attention away from the large
region of welfare-state activities that are not based on solidarities and duties.
Peter Squires similarly links the construction of the domain of solidarity char-
acteristic of the contemporary welfare state to the creation of a set of political
exclusions. Practices such as selective immigration policy, incarceration, dis-
ciplinary schooling, mental institutionalization, or what John Torpey has
called the development of the state monopoly over the means of movement
may create commonalities  common subordination to administrative cate-
gories and practices  but the extent to which commonalities become soli-
darities is very much an open question.12 On the other hand, welfare state
institutions may have redistributive effects in the capitalist economy which
are masked by an exclusive focus on the political nature of solidarisme.
10 Émile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (New York: Free Press, 1968), The Rules of the
Sociological Method (Garden City, N.J.: Free Press, 1982), and Professional Ethics and Civic Morals
(London: Routledge, 1993). Donzelot relies heavily on The Division of Labor, but Professional Ethics
contains the more mature statement of the position. The theoretical problem with this sort of reading
is that it tends to under-emphasize the organicist model in Durkheims work and to ignore his focus
on effects of structure.
11 Jacques Donzelot, The Policing of Families, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon Books,
1979).
12 Donzelot, The Policing of Families; Peter Squires, Anti-Social Policy (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester,
1990); Steinmetz, Regulating the Social; John Torpey, The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance,
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Debates about society and the social question certainly predated the 1848
revolutions in Europe, and Donzelots analysis is weakened by its punctual
character. Attempts before Durkheim to depoliticize class relations were
numerous and varied. As John Eyler observed of the English case, from the
[eighteen] thirties onwards middle-class people were continuously digging
channels by which working class demands could be drained away from the
foundations of property. Yet attempts to find communitarian and socialist
solutions to the social question also abounded; they came as much from below
as from above.13 Giovanna Procacci also questions Donzelots notion of the
social as an invention, as if it were a ruse of reason. While arguing that the
emergence of the social is inextricably tied up with a strategy for depoliticiz-
ing des inégalités (tant en matière de richesse quen matière dautorité) qui
traversent la société dégaux, she suggests that its history is to be written in
terms of its content, rather than simply in terms of its supposed political func-
tions. Insurance techniques do not exhaust the substance of the social.14
Like most Foucauldians, Procacci locates her work against crude Marxist
attempts that read the social question only as the history of the industrial
reserve army. For her, the social is not an object that stands outside class
struggle, but neither is it an instrument of class interest. The social is inher-
ently a political construct that emerges at the point of intersection of particu-
lar forms of knowledge and administrative practices. The point against
Donzelots position is that the history of the social is a history of knowledge
production and of the practical administration of class and other kinds of
struggles; it does not spring into being as a bold theoretical move.
It is certainly possible to agree with Donzelot as to the centrality of the
birth of the category unemployment in the consolidation of the social and
also to attend closely to the technology of knowledge involved in its objecti-
fication. Mitchell Deans examination of the emergence of poverty is a case
in point.15 Again, William Walterss account of national insurance in England
shows that Beveridges labour bureau was itself a site of knowledge produc-
tion which makes possible a representation of the labour market that is uni-
versal in its scope and dynamic. Rendered visible in this way, the labour
market becomes a site for new types of calculation and intervention on the
part of national government.16 The positive content of the social cannot be
separated from the practices, instruments, techniques, or devices which
make it visible and objectify it.
13 For quotation, see John M. Eyler, Victorian Social Medicine: The Ideas and Methods of William Farr
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1979), p. 23; see also Barbara Taylor, Eve and the New
Jerusalem (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983).
14 Giovanna Procacci, Gouverner la misère : la question sociale en France, 1789–1848 (Paris: Seuil,
1993), pp. 2425.
15 Mitchell Dean, The Constitution of Poverty: Toward a Genealogy of Liberal Governance (London:
Routledge, 1991).
16 William Walters, The Discovery of Unemployment: New Forms for the Government of Poverty,
Economy and Society (1994), p. 283, and Unemployment and Government: Genealogies of the Social
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
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In contrast to Donzelots social invention, François Ewalds far more
detailed analysis does not take statistical technique and insurance technolo-
gies as givens. Rather, Ewald argues that it is through the application of the
calculus of probabilities (whose genealogy one must investigate) to state-
generated observations that the realm of the social comes to be specified and
objectified. Against the backdrop of the French Revolutions dream of a uni-
form and universal sphere of liberty and equality, Ewald investigates the fate
of a liberal diagram of power confronted by the endemic proletarian misery
generated by industrial capitalism. Although he does not frame the matter in
quite these terms, one can see that an important issue in his analysis con-
cerns the manner in which the social question imposes itself as such on the
consciousness of politicians, intellectuals, reformers, and activists. It does so
not simply, and likely not primarily, through their own direct experience of
working-class life, although the slum tour and slum exposé literature were
likely as common in France as in England. Rather, the social question was
posed through a developing social science with its own modes of represen-
tation. I consider briefly the early history and the conditions of operation of
the social science before addressing Ewalds work.
Kenneth Baker situated the earliest usages of the term social science in
the first years of the French Revolution, especially by those close to Con-
dorcet in the 1789 Club. The Clubs membership was diverse, but it shared the
proposition that the menacing chaos of revolution could be tamed if the dis-
passionate observational practices of the physical sciences were extended to
the condition of the nation. In contrast to moral philosophy, which aimed to
serve as the guide to individual happiness, the social art or social science
would determine the principles of happiness of the nation as a whole. From
the outset, there was a close connection between the extension of happiness
and the extension of commerce. Both the extension of commerce and the sys-
tematic observation of the nations condition demanded the standardization of
a range of conditions in the nation itself, against the arcane localisms of the
ancien régime. For Condorcet, the social science was to render human rela-
tions calculable, to make them the object of a social mathematics. To carry out
this project, it was necessary to invest relations and conditions in common cat-
egories and to subject them to conventions of uniform measurement.17
The possibilities for a social science based on systematic observation, in
France as elsewhere, were shaped by the political and administrative organi-
zation of the nation, even as the fruits of the social science were intended
to change such organization. Unevenly and partially, the revolutionary
project sought to impose uniform and standard equivalences throughout
French political space, as well as in the client republics. Of particular impor-
tance was the establishment of the état civil, which displaced the church by
agencies of the state as registrar and which established and enforced a com-
17 Kenneth Michael Baker, Inventing the French Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1990), and The Early History of the Term Social Science, Annals of Science, vol. 20 (1964), pp.
211226.
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mon status for citizens. Related identifying practices banned honorific titles,
constrained people to take their patronym, specified acceptable first names,
and further regulated the names that could be taken by Jews and the Dutch.18
Combined with the division of the national territory into départements,
attempts to establish uniform weights and measures, to standardize fiscal
policy and even linguistic usage, the revolutionary project configured spaces
and identities in ways that were conducive to statistical translation and
appropriation.19 The short-lived Bureau de Statistique promoted practical
projects to generate statistical knowledge. Between the abolition of the
bureau in 1811 and the establishment of the Statistique Générale de France
in 1835, government statistical production operated at the local level. Yet
systematic investigations of conditions in Paris were undertaken and publi-
cation of crime and related statistics began in the late 1820s.
In terms of the essays in this collection, the shifting groundwork for the
common domain of the social is laid by administrative and related prac-
tices and conventions of classification, categorization, standardization, and
reporting. Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Leigh Stars work on classification
makes the important point that integrated systems of knowledge classifica-
tion and standardization, at least when they are mobilized by powerful
authorities, work by changing the world such that the systems description
of reality becomes true. A powerful classification which, like the Interna-
tional Classification of Diseases, comes to form part of the infrastructure of
investigation enforces a certain understanding of context, place, and time. It
makes a certain set of discoveries, which validate its own framework, much
more likely than an alternative set outside of the framework, since the eco-
nomic cost of producing a study outside of the framework of normal data
collection is necessarily much higher. Of course, costs can be political as
well as economic, but the self-replicating nature of enacted classifications 
what Bowker and Star call convergence  is important to bear in mind.
The commonalities that are infrastructural to the social, evidently, are
abstractions  mobilized politically they may be constitutive abstractions
 that shape life chances (school child, visible minority, illegal immigrant,
senior citizen, for example) and that may be embraced or resisted by those
subjected to them.20 The essays in our collection investigate some practices
18 Anne Lefebvre-Teillard, Le nom : droit et histoire (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1990);
Desrosières, Discuter lindiscutable.
19 Marie-Noëlle Bourguet, Déchiffrer la France. La statistique départementale à l’époque napoléo-
nienne (Paris, 1988), and Décrire, Compter, Calculer: The Debate over Statistics During the Napole-
onic Period in Lorenz Krüger et al., eds., The Probabilistic Revolution, vol. 1: Ideas in History
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990), pp. 305316.
20 Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Leigh Star, Sorting Things Out: Classification and its Consequences
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1999), pp. 4952. For a discussion of constitutive abstractions, see
Rob Watts, Government and Modernity: An Essay in Thinking Governmentality, ARENA Journal,
vol. 2 (19931994), pp. 103157.
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of abstraction, representation, and instrumentation that subtend the discur-
sive and programmatic objectification of the social.
François Ewalds method of analysis involves the investigation of the fate
of the liberal political rationality established by the French Revolution both as
a programme and as a diagram of rule.21 Studying liberal rationality as a
programme involves investigating the forms of practices it enjoins and pro-
hibts, the manner in which it identifies and problematizes those objects that
must be governed, and the calculus which precedes such practices. The notion
of diagram comes from Foucaults analysis of the panopticon as a model of
disciplinary power. Benthams self-regulating machine, argued Foucault, cap-
tured a political dream of governmental arrangements which were more or
less manifest in a host of interconnected institutions, and, perhaps ultimately,
in the disciplinary society as a whole.
The notion of diagram, then, posits the existence of a general schematic
plan, a fantasy or dream about what would be perfect and perfectly self-reg-
ulating political arrangements. Following Gilles Deleuze, Ewald suggests
that diagrams have two characteristics. First, they are abstract machines in
the sense just mentioned of schemas of perfect functioning in a variety of
institutions that may communicate with one another. Secondly, un dia-
gramme est un échangeur in both of the senses offered to us by Robert,
namely appareil destiné à réchauffer ou refroidir un fluide, au moyen dun
autre fluide qui circule à une température différente and intersection
routière à plusieurs niveaux.
The liberal diagram of power presented an image of a world in which
autonomous, self-regulating individuals, free to do whatever did not injure
another, would pursue their self-interests and, importantly, would take
responsibility for the consequences of their actions and for the situations in
which they found themselves. A sharp line was drawn between the juridical
order and moral phenomena: law had no place in the specification of com-
portment. Laissez aller, laissez passer: such a political order would guaran-
tee individual and collective wealth and happiness.
Against arguments that see capitalist relations only in terms of a cash
nexus, however, Ewald insists that the liberal diagram contained a pro-
foundly moral vision of order. Self-interest co-existed with the moral obliga-
tion of benevolence. Poverty and misery were accidental occurrences, due
either to the corrigible defect of individual will known as lack of foresight or
to disturbing unanticipated events. In either case, the natural sympathy exist-
ing among men demanded intervention to aid the unfortunate. Such inter-
vention was benevolent, individual, and punctual: a freely-given act of good
will on the part of those who intervened. It aimed to help people to help
themselves, either by correcting defects that might lead to lack of foresight
or by providing necessary resources in the face of accidental events. Benev-
21 Ewald, L’État providence, pp. 5051.
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olence aimed to restore the subject to a condition of liberty; it was necessar-
ily selective and temporary and was a moral rather than a legal obligation.
Legislating benevolence would destroy its humane character and practical
effectiveness.
The weaknesses of the liberal diagram and the lack of efficacy of liberal
programmes of rule were made evident as the conditions of life and labour
under industrial capitalism were generalized in France from the 1820s. At
the same time, the multiplication of observational resources resulting from
national and local municipal administrative organization supported new
ways of objectifying such conditions. New forms of life and labour, new
forms of administration, and new forms of knowledge went hand in hand.
The developing social science, involved in generating and interpreting
observational resources, encouraged new ways of reflecting on the condi-
tion of the nation, and its proponents created new organs of communication
in which to do so  Les Annales d’hygiène publique et de médecine légale,
for instance.22 In a period of rising class struggles, investigative projects,
such as Louis-René Villermés demonstration of the intimate connections
between housing conditions and mortality rates in Paris, undermined the
claim that poverty was an individual failing or misfortune. In Alain Des-
rosièress terms, through the work of investigation and abstraction, things
thought to be isolated and independent came to stay together and the
understanding of causal forces changed.23 Poverty was seen to exist in a new
form  pauperism  no longer an accident that occurred to an individual,
but rather an injury inflicted on a population or class by existing conditions.
Social science revealed the existence of effects of structure.
Framing pauperism as a social question, in Ewalds analysis, did not
cause the liberal diagram to disappear at once. However, the new kinds of
projects undertaken to address it displaced the line in the diagram that sepa-
rated formal juridical regulation (freedom of contract) from private moral
regulation (benevolence). In the French case, the Factory Act of 1841, which
limited childrens employment, interfered with parental rights and also
embodied the claim that defects of will demanded state intervention and state
tutelage. Liberal philanthropic programmes paid increasing attention to the
milieu in which mens character was formed, becoming themselves more
systematic and continuous, while operating a displacement of the social
question away from class relations in the workplace to gender relations in
the household (about which Ewald has little to say).
We need not follow in any detail Ewalds analysis of the working out of
the dynamic whereby attempts to address the social question led to the
consequent erasure of the line separating the legal from the moral. What is
22 Bernard-Pierre Lecuyer, Médecins et observateurs sociaux : Les Annales d’hygiène publique et de
médecine légale (18201850) in Pour une histoire de la statistique (Paris: Institut national de la
Statistique et des Études économiques, 1977), pp. 445476.
23 Desrosières, How to Make Things.
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germane is that the practices of investigation and reflection that caused the
social question to emerge and that constituted it as a particular kind of
question, amenable to certain kinds of responses, created awareness of a new
order of phenomena and gave it material form: society and the social.
The argument is not that society was invented at this moment  a notion
of society has a much longer pedigree, and claims about the good of soci-
ety served to justify such initiatives as late-eighteenth-century feminist
demands for womens education. Rather, society was specified through new
modes of objectification: new techniques and practices for delimiting it and
for making it knowable were developed. It became a new and forceful kind
of object.24
For Ewald, it was L.-A.-J. Quetelets analysis of the average man in the
science called social physics that did the main work of objectification
which led to the social question being read as the result of a new order of
phenomena. Quételets accomplishment was to apply the calculus of proba-
bilities to statistical observations of human populations and to events in the
nation. As Ewald put it,
limportance de Quetelet est davoir été un carrefour, un lieu de croisement, un
point de précipitation. Des choses encore isolées, dispersées, séparées vont
grâce à lui se mettre à communiquer et à prendre une forme nouvelle, de nou-
veaux développements, un nouvel avenir. Quetelet est lhomme de luniversa-
lisation des probabilités  qui est léchangeur universel , celui à travers qui
lastronomie communique avec le penchant du crime; la météorologie, avec
les tables de mortalité.25
The calculus revealed the existence of a new order of reality  society 
and led eventually to suggestions of new means for dealing with the social
question  risk technology and insurance.
Quetelets work has attracted renewed attention in recent years (despite
the fact that most North American history and sociology students still never
hear his name), and this is not the place to outline his sociology in any
24 Corrigan and Sayer point out that the meaning of society shifted in the England of the 1820s and
1830s. Initially written as Society and referring to the conditions of sociation of the ruling classes
(in Jane Austens Pride and Prejudice, some members of the lesser gentry are seen but little in Soci-
ety), it increasingly came to be written as society and to refer to the conditions of sociation in the
nation more generally. Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer, The Great Arch: English State Formation as
Cultural Revolution (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985); David Frisby and Derek Sayer, Society (Lon-
don: Tavistock, 1986). Peter Wagner makes a similar observation, relating the multiplication of little
Societies in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries to the emergence of society: The
broadening of the meaning of society is then a response to an observable change in the structure of
social relations, i.e., in the ways the lives of human beings are connected to one another. Peter Wag-
ner,  An Entirely New Object of Consciousness, of Volition, of Thought: The Coming into Being
and (Almost) Passing Away of Society as a Scientific Object in Lorraine Daston, ed., Biographies
of Scientific Objects (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), pp. 132157.
25 Ewald, L’État providence, p. 146.
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detail.26 Ewald argues that Quetelets application of the calculus of probabil-
ities to statistical observations effected an epistemological break. The inven-
tion of the average man: this move  ruse or trick  made it possible to
bridge the gap between the infinite diversity of individual conditions and
wills and the kinds of regularities revealed in studies of the social question.
The application of the calculus caused that dramatic decentring of the liberal
political subject which is the foundational move for sociology. It now became
possible to think of society as an entity in its own right, traversed by regular-
ities which are not simply the summation of the results of individual wills. In
turn, thinking of society in this way made possible a redistribution of respon-
sibilities, away from individuals and towards the collectivity. Yet the accep-
tance of the social calculus also made it necessary to know the individual
through its relation to society. Society came to be seen as a law-like entity, in
the sense that it is the site of regularities, tendencies, and penchants that
repeat themselves in determinate relations to one another. These regularities
were constraining; individual life could be understood in relation to them.
The reality of society appears in the average which, for Quetelet in a con-
sistently positive conception, is at once the form to which all individuals
tend, or the axis around which they rotate, and the measure of perfection.
What is germane for our purpose is to notice the new field of knowledge that
is opened through the application of the calculus. While knowing the aver-
age age at death of members of a population, for instance, does not tell us the
age at which any individual will die, it points to what comes to be taken as a
new order of reality. It establishes a thoroughly non-metaphysical standard
of judgement about individuals, and for individuals about themselves, but it
also establishes a potential object for action: the average conditions of life.
Moreover, through Quetelets deployment of it, numerical representation
acquired a new stature, power, and prestige. Aggregates were now entities in
their own right: the sum was different than its parts.27
Ewald argues that the joining of the calculus of probabilities to statistical
observation launches an observational spiral, a drive to observe everything,
given the claimed universal applicability of the calculus. For Quetelet, such
observation had to be a matter of state administration because, for masses of
measurements to be useful and precise, common units of measurement had
to be employed. It was the responsibility of states not only to configure rela-
tions within national populations in a manner that was susceptible to mea-
surement, but also to store the masses of material generated. Hence
Quetelets initiatives in founding the International Statistical Congress.28
26 Jean-Pierre Beaud and Jean-Guy Prévost, Back to Quételet, Recherches sociologiques, vol. 2
(1998), pp. 83100; Ian Hacking, The Taming of Chance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1990); J. Lottin, Quételet : statisticien et sociologue (Louvain, 1912).
27 Theodore Porter, in Rise of Statistical Thinking, 1820–1900 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1986), points out that it is Quételet whom Marx invokes in justification of his central concept aver-
age social labour.
28 Ewald, L’invention du social, pp. 151152; Bruce Curtis, The Politics of Population: Statistics, State
Formation, and the Census of Canada, 1840–1875 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001).
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For Ewalds analysis of the rise of the welfare state, Quetelets work is
important for its displacement of the notion of responsibility from the indi-
vidual to the collectivity. While the liberal diagram of power implodes
through the working out of concrete practices and struggles in France in the
later decades of the nineteenth century, sociologys portrayal of society as a
risky business does some of the work necessary for the social question to be
taken up through insurance technologies. Social insurance is seen to be the
model programme of the welfare state, and, with its generalization, we have
moved beyond the liberal diagram of power. As Mitchell Dean has com-
mented, the development of workers compensation, with its collectivization
of risk and de-dramatization of social conflicts, can be viewed as a signal
case of governmental techniques of this kind.29
Yet just what insurance technologies signal in relation to the welfare state
remains debatable. Perhaps it was credible to argue in the France of the
1980s that the generalization of social insurance would undermine liberal-
ism; the argument appears less credible both there and in other countries
where neo-liberal restructuring of the welfare state has tended to shift the
burden of financial and moral responsibility for a range of conditions back
onto individuals, their families and social networks. An upwards redistribu-
tion of wealth, sometimes a radical redistribution, has accompanied such
restructuring. In the mid-1990s, writers like Robert Castel were considering
the metamorphosis of the social question in the light of the failure of soli-
darisme to offer purchase on the new forms of disaffiliation characteristic
of life in France.30
In any case, social insurance was only one instance  and a relatively
late instance at that  of attempts to fashion domains of solidarity that
would transcend class antagonism in early industrial capitalism.31 Taking
insurance as the signal case may encourage an overly benign view of the
welfare state. Indeed, the accounts of the welfare state offered by Ewald,
Donzelot, and other Foucauldians have justly been criticized on this ground,
as well as for their tendency to read Michel Foucaults analysis of state for-
mation (through the triangulation of sovereignty, discipline, and govern-
29 Dean, Sociology After Society, p. 213.
30 Robert Castel, Les métamorphoses de la question sociale. Une chronique du salariat, l’espace du
politique (Paris: Fayard, 1995). Although he locates himself in the history of the present, Castels
explicit engagement in social democratic politics distinguishes his work from that of many English-
language contributors to this approach. As he puts it in his foreword, Sans doute sommes-nous
placés devant une bifurcation : accepter une société tout entière soumise aux exigences de lécono-
mie, ou construire une figure de lÉtat social à la mesure des nouveaux défis (p. 23). His preference
is clearly for the latter.
31 For the example of prisons, see Patrick Carroll-Burke, The Making of the Irish Convict System (Dub-
lin: Four Courts Press, 2000); for education, see Bruce Curtis, The Buller Education Commission;
or, the London Statistical Society Comes to Canada, 183842 in J.-P. Beaud and J.-G. Prévost, eds.,
The Age of Numbers/ L’ère du chiffre (Quebec: Presses Universitaires du Québec, 2000), pp. 278
297; The State of Tutelage in Lower Canada, 183551, History of Education Quarterly, vol. 37, no.
1 (1997), pp. 2543; and True Government by Choice Men? Inspection, Education and State Forma-
tion in Canada West (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992).
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ment) as a stage theory.32 Debate in the literature has carried the point that
domination and discipline remain infrastructural to liberal governmentality,
and we need not belabour it here. Two matters do merit further discussion:
the gendered nature of the realm of the social and the uneasy development of
the nineteenth-century social science in relation to statistics.
The translation of nineteenth-century class struggles around proletarian
misery into the social question was bound up with a series of redefinitions of
the position and roles of women and children. As Ewald himself argued, the
inherently flawed political subjectivities of women and children posited by
political liberalism exempted them from the responsibility and autonomy
associated with the freedom to contract. Liberal and middle-class readings of
the social question as a problem of male workers domestic situation focused
on womens employment and household management and on childrens
employment and defective education as key determinants of pauperization.
Even more radical commentators like Friedrich Engels, who initially saw
proletarian misery as a product of workers competition for scarce employ-
ment, were shocked by the ways capitalist industry unmanned men. Capi-
talism demoralized the working class: the (re-)establishment of paternal
dominance in the domestic realm was as central to liberal as to early socialist
projects.33
From the first decades of the nineteenth century in Europe and America,
social investigation and protective legislation created classifications in which
the categories women and children were solidified and on which further
investigative activity then converged, although these categories remained
overdetermined by class relations. Protective legislation might regulate
womens hours of employment in the textile factories or insist that children
spend half days at school, but middle-class women and children were not its
targets. On the contrary, the constitution of the social as a sphere of domes-
ticity and tutelage in isolation from politics created new relations of power.
Not only did middle-class women come legitimately to be active as philan-
thropic visitors teaching the poor how to live, but as mothers made con-
scious they entered paid employment and state bureaucracies as school
teachers.34 As Denise Riley has remarked, insofar as the concerns of the
social are the responsibility of women in the family, women are firmly tied to
what has already been feminised. Women come to be objects of social inves-
tigation; but the social is also seen as a field in which they can conduct
32 Michel Foucault, La « gouvernementalité » in Dits et écrits, vol. 3 (Paris: Gallimard, 1994); Barry
Hindess, Liberalism, Socialism and Democracy: Variations on a Governmental Theme, and Alan
Hunt, Governing the City: Liberalism and Early Modern Modes of Governance in Andrew Barry et
al., eds., Foucault and Political Reason. Nikolas Rose attempts to refute such charges in Powers of
Freedom.
33 Friedrich Engels, Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844 (Moscow: Progress Publishers,
1973). On the connection between state formation and family formation, see Pavla Miller, Transfor-
mations of Patriarchy in the West, 1500–1900 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998).
34 Carolyn Steedman,  The Mother Made Conscious , History Workshop Journal.
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enquiry and have a moral influence. And the conceptualisation of the social
in these terms severs it from politics. But the constitution of the social as a
moral domain for women and their demonstrative capacity to act and orga-
nize in it provide a basis for the eruption of the values of the domestic back
into the political  for instance, as demands for enfranchisement and move-
ments for moral purity.35
Numbers exploded into the lives of Europeans and Americans from the
first decades of the nineteenth century, and public school systems sought to
make everyone a counter and a calculator.36 Statistics increasingly lost its
earlier meaning as a general inventory of all the conditions in the nation and
came to be seen more or less completely as knowledge in numerical form.
Numerical and statistical representations coexisted in an uneasy or ambigu-
ous relation to narrative and literary description, but they were of central
importance in the objectification of the social question. As we have seen, for
Quételet, society lived in measures derived from large-scale observations 
in what Durkheim would later call social facts. Yet Quetelets claims for
statistics were unusually sophisticated and were also controversial, both
politically and morally, to many of his contemporaries. It would be as mis-
leading to present the history of the social as driven by sustained theoretical
reflection on statistics as it would be to suggest that social facts were sim-
ply the result of dispassionate observations.
Complex relations obtained among the techniques of knowledge produc-
tion that yielded the avalanche of numbers, theoretical reflection on the
significance of statistics, and policy and practice that applied statistical
thinking to problems and issues. The increasing administrative capacities of
nineteenth-century states, which resulted from the inroads of bureaucratic
organization and from the generalization of new investigative instruments
such as inspection, interacted with the capitalist transformation of media of
communication (via things such as steam printing and improved methods for
paper production) to yield massive volumes of statistical material which
could be distributed widely. In the Canadian case, for instance, an extremely
35 Riley, Am I That Name?, p. 50; also Alan Hunt, Governing Morals: A Social History of Moral Regu-
lation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Mariana Valverde, The Age of Light, Soap
and Water: Moral Reform in English Canada, 1880s–1920s (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1991).
36 Patricia Cline Cohen, A Calculating People: The Spread of Numeracy in Early America (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1982); Michael J. Cullen, The Statistical Movement in Early Victorian
Britain (New York: Harvester, 1975); Jean-Jacques Droesbeke and Phillipe Tassi, Histoire de la
statistique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1990); L. Goldman, Statistics and the Science of
Society in Britain: A Social Context for the G.R.O., Social History of Medicine, vol. 4, no. 3 (1991),
pp. 415434; Ian Hacking, Biopower and the Avalanche of Printed Numbers, Humanities in Soci-
ety, vol. 5 (1982), pp. 279295; Sylvana Patriarca, Numbers and Nationhood: Writing Statistics in
Nineteenth-Century Italy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Stuart J. Woolf, Towards
the History of the Origins of Statistics: France, 17891815 in J.-C. Perron and Stuart J. Woolf, eds.,
State and Statistics in France 1789–1815 (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers GmmbH,
1984), pp. 81194.
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small state administration was producing more documentary material by
1855 than parliament could even pay to print. Yet statistical bulimia seemed
often to result from no particular administrative or political interest; it was
not a footnote to political reason. There was certainly no simple line of
determination running from well-articulated rationalities of government
towards statistical investigation as a technology of government. As The-
odore Porter put it, practice was decidedly ahead of theory during the early
history of statistics, and pure or abstract statistics was the offspring, not the
parent, of its applications.37
Routine administrative questions and practical attempts at particular
moral reforms, rather than theoretical reflection, led the development of
nineteenth-century British social science, as Philip Abramss Origins of Brit-
ish Sociology stressed. The activity of the London Statistical Society is illus-
trative. The society was founded in 1834 (Quetelet had a hand in it), two
years after the organization of the first English government statistics agency
within the Board of Trade. Like its counterpart in Manchester, founded in
1833, the London society was explicitly charged with investigating the kinds
of questions that were beyond the purview of the government body. Yet there
was considerable overlap between the membership of the statistical societies
and the state service. James Kay, for instance, whom Poovey credits with the
elaboration of a common method of social investigation, a founding member
of the Manchester society, was later secretary to the Privy Council Commit-
tee on Education, and there was also Rawson W. Rawson, at one and the
same time secretary to the London Statistical Society and secretary to the
Board of Trade. Abrams remarks that the early London society looked like a
Whig government sub-committee.38
As others have since noted as well, the London society sought explicitly
to exclude debate and discussion of doctrine in its meetings and publica-
tions. The dispassionate collection of the facts was to be its main object, and
facts were presented numerically, at least in part. The supposed neutrality of
numerical representation was one instrument for the depoliticization of the
consequences of capitalist industrialization when they were read as the
social question. Abrams shows that, of the 511 papers produced in the Lon-
don societys first 50 years, only 11 concerned matters of statistical method
and only 8 addressed political questions directly, although a number took up
administrative or institutional matters. It was only rarely the case that the
question to be investigated was seen to be sufficiently obscure as to require
preliminary study. The society could investigate matters without any prior
37 Porter, Statistical Thinking, p. 11; Bruce Curtis, Selective Publicity and Informed Public Opinion in
the Canadas, 18411856, History of Education Review, vol. 27, no. 1 (1998), pp. 119.
38 Philip Abrams, The Origins of British Sociology: 1834–1914 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1968); Mary Poovey, Curing the Social Body in 1832: James Phillips Kay and the Irish in
Manchester, Gender & History, vol. 5, no. 2 (1993), pp. 196211, and Making a Social Body: British
Cultural Formation, 1830–1864 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).
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framing of the object of enquiry, and could report on findings without con-
tentious debate, because a deep-seated utilitarian Christian meliorism pro-
vided a consensus about what was to be found and what was to be done
about it.39
Statistical representations thus served potentially as political capital, a point
carried home by Samuel Finers analysis of the penetration of Benthamite util-
itarianism into the English state system in the first half of the nineteenth cen-
tury. Finer read the nineteenth-century English revolution in government as
a dynamic process of knowledge politics. Benthamite reformers exploited
new media of communication to promote moral panics around matters such as
conditions in factories, the absence of education for children, and urban san-
itation. Repeatedly, such conditions demanded enquiry; enquiry confirmed
the necessity for reform; the necessity for reform led to declarative legislation
that often extended powers of enquiry; further enquiry showed declarative
legislation to be ineffective without enforcement and regular monitoring;
enforcement and regular monitoring promoted the growth of new government
departments and locked the condition at issue into administrative categories.40
The investigations that helped form and objectify the social commonly
claimed to reveal the facts. As Mary Poovey has shown, facts are peculiar
phenomena, and the belief that truth resides in them has a complex history.41
Modern facts are at once supposedly meaningful particulars and pieces of evi-
dence that point to more general orders of significance. The modern fact thus
contains an inherent tension and is continually faced with the possibility of
implosion. Its ability to signify as a particular in its own right is threatened by
its necessary dependence upon some overarching theoretical schema. Only
systematic inattention to the latter can preserve the taken-for-grantedness
which is the factualness of facts. For Poovey, the history of the modern fact
is in large measure the story of attempts to maintain the gap between the fact
as a theoretical construct and the fact as a product of empirical perception.
The social question was depoliticized in large part through attempts to
render it a factual question represented in numbers. In the English case,
Poovey signals the importance of the work of J. R. McCulloch in sustaining
factual modes of representation by making the separation between fact and
theory a matter of the division of intellectual labour. The production of facts
would be conducted neutrally by observers like those in the statistical
39 Lawrence Goldman, The Social Science Association: A Context for Mid-Victorian Liberalism,
English Historical Review (1986), pp. 95134, and The Social Science Association and the Absence
of Sociology in Nineteenth Century Britain, Past and Present, vol. 114 (1987), pp. 154161; V. L.
Hilts, Aliis Exterendum, or, the Origins of the Statistical Society of London, Isis, vol. 69 (1978),
pp. 2143.
40 Samuel E. Finer, The Transmission of Benthamite Ideas, 182050 in Gillian Sutherland, ed., Stud-
ies in the Growth of Nineteenth Century Government (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), pp.
1132. See also Christopher Hamlin, Public Health and Social Justice in the Age of Chadwick: Brit-
ain, 1800–1854 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
41 Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact.
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societies. Political economists would then divine the essential significance
and the policy implications of facts thus collected. To complete the circle,
education, especially of the working classes, would create the necessary
appreciation for the rationality of policy as articulated by political economy
and based on the facts.
Yet the political content of factual representation intruded repeatedly and
in a variety of forms in nineteenth-century debate over statistics and the
social. Statistics were viciously satirized as the assassin of the human imagi-
nation in Charles Dickenss Hard Times, where a McCulloch-like figure,
who had it in charge from high authority to bring about the great public-
office millenium [sic], when commissioners should reign upon the earth,
declared that we hope to have, before long, a board of fact, composed of
commissioners of fact, who will force the people to be a people of fact, and
of nothing but fact.42 The English workers movement attacked attempts by
the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge to make political econ-
omy and the physical sciences the subject matter of popular education on the
grounds of the political character of what the society claimed were neutral
facts. What workers wanted was really useful knowledge that would lead
to political liberation.43
Several authors have underlined the importance of nineteenth-century
medical debate in projects to promote the utility and legitimacy of large-
scale investigation and of knowledge of the social via statistical representa-
tion and calculation. Yet practising family physicians, clinicians, proponents
of experimental medicine, sanitarians or anti-contagionists, and fledgling
demographers squared off repeatedly over the worth of medical statistics.44
Here again the existence of effects of structure was partly what was at issue.
Statistical investigation made inroads into medical science in areas such as
the investigation of the success of smallpox vaccination and in heated
debates over the effectiveness of bloodletting as a therapeutics. In France, a
pathbreaking set of investigations by the medical doctor Louis-René Vil-
lermé in the early 1830s drew on detailed statistical data for the city of Paris
to connect mortality rates and levels of poverty. Similar studies fuelled the
debates between contagionists and sanitarians over the causes of cholera in
the wake of the 1832 epidemic.45
42 Charles Dickens, Hard Times (London: Heinemann, 1960 [1854]), pp. 46. Poovey claims MChoa-
kumchild is modelled after McCulloch, but this seems dubious since MChoakumchild is a trained
schoolmaster. Rather it is the third gentleman who makes the remarks I have cited that is a more
likely model for McCulloch.
43 Richard Johnson,  Really Useful Knowledge: Radical Working Class Culture in J. Clarke et al.,
eds., Working Class Culture: Studies in History and Theory (London: Hutchinson, 1979).
44 This debate and similar ones have been discussed repeatedly in the literature on the history of statis-
tics and medical knowledge. I follow Joshua Cole, The Power of Large Numbers: Population, Poli-
tics, and Gender in Nineteenth-Century France (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000).
45 François Delaporte, Disease and Civilization: The Cholera in Paris, 1832 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press, 1986); Catherine J. Kudlick, Cholera in Post-Revolutionary Paris: A Cultural History (Berke-
ley: University of California Press, 1996).
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The growing scepticism and political concern of some doctors faced with
the proliferation of statistical knowledges was intensified by the formation
of the Statistique Générale de France in 1835 and the regular statistical
reporting that ensued. In 1837 a debate in the Académie de Médecine cen-
tred on the ontological status of the objects of statistical investigation, on the
practical utility of statistical knowledge for medical practice, and, Joshua
Cole suggests, on the political import of statistical reasoning. Family physi-
cians and experimental clinicians, concerned to deal with particular sick
individuals or with pathological lesions, argued that statistics were of no
practical use. Knowing that more people died in one Paris arrondissement
than in another offered nothing for the treatment of the sick individual in the
clinic nor for unlocking the secrets of morbid states in bodily organs: the
causal mechanisms of illness remained opaque. Moreover, it was claimed
that statistical averages and rates were simply products of thought: the aver-
age illness had no ontological status, it was never to be met with empiri-
cally. Statisticians were forced to render what was essentially different the
same in order to produce their averages and rates; in doing so they disre-
garded the individualizing characteristics of illness, which were precisely
what the doctor was to combat. Furthermore, the construction of false statis-
tical equivalences disregarded the indispensable subjective role of the doctor
in medical treatment. It was the trained and empathetic doctor alone who
could diagnose, who could divine the underlying signs of illness in the body
from the patients symptoms.
Because averages did not exist, statistics was a form of fantasy at best.
Worse, according to Cole, some medical opinion in the 1830s connected the
privileging of the majority or of the average in statistical analysis with unbri-
dled democracy and with the attacks on élite privilege characteristic of pro-
letarian unrest under the July Monarchy. The statistical form was seen to be
a shamelessly democratic political form.
Sanitarians, by contrast, even while unable to point to precise causal
mechanisms, were increasingly able to make the claim that engineering the
conditions of life and labour of different social classes yielded demonstrable
consequences for mortality and morbidity at the level of populations. A cen-
trally important instance was John Snows use of the English General Regis-
ter Offices reports of death by cause and locality to support the claim that
cholera was waterborne. In William Colemans evocative phrase, it was seen
that death is a social disease.46 Moreover, the practical utility of construct-
ing variations in rates of death and disease in terms of averages or optima
reinforced the belief that statistical entities had a firm ontological status,
even if they were not accessible by the senses. Statistical investigation was
increasingly legitimated in what came to be seen as social medicine in the
46  William Coleman, Death Is a Social Disease: Public Health and Political Economy in Early Indus-
trial France (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982); John Snow, On the Mode of Communi-
cation of Cholera, 2nd ed. (London: John Churchill, 1855).
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following decades. By the late 1850s, the early demographer Louis-Adolphe
Bertillon could argue credibly in relation to infant mortality that statistics
constituted a tool for making things visible: infants died, but only the popu-
lation of infants had mortality. Individual deaths could be prevented by
unlocking the causes of mortality at the level of population. Perhaps the con-
secration of the union of medicine and statistics can be found in Émile
Durkheims 1895 portrayal of the role of the sociologist in relation to society
as like that of the medical doctor.47
From the second decade of the nineteenth century, the social question was
taken up and objectified through a variety of forms of investigation and prac-
tices of representation. The social acquired a firmer ontological status by
being materialized in representational devices and instruments. Tables,
charts, maps, questionnaires, numerical summaries, graphs, photographs,
and so on invest social relations in forms that are manipulable, measureable,
scaleable, transportable, actionable. Such instruments lend new forms of vis-
ibility to relations and conditions, as they seem to fix the social as an object
which might form the grounds for a science. The history of the social is in
part a history of technology.
Yet such instruments are also what Bruno Latour has called immutable
mobiles, devices that change conditions observed in localities by translat-
ing them onto the flat surfaces of texts and that render them manipulable in
centres of calculation, from whence they may come again to challenge con-
ditions in localities. In this sense, immutable mobiles launch the social into
movement. Indeed, in a retrospective reflection on the branch of science
studies known as actor-network theory, Latour proposes that the major
accomplishment of this approach has been to have transformed the social
from what was a surface, a territory, a province of reality, into a circula-
tion.48 Mapping the social question onto the universalizing domain of
state-political subordination had, as one of its historical consequences, the
translation of class domination into matters of gender, racial, and age domi-
nation. I use the concept translation here in the original sense of its
employment in actor-network theory, where it resonates with its close com-
panions rendering and treason to indicate the process whereby one thing
is treated as the equivalent of another.49 The argument is not that age, gen-
47  Durkheim, The Rules of the Sociological Method, especially the chapter The Normal and the Patho-
logical. Compare Roses account of diagnostics, scattered throughout Powers of Freedom (but see
pp. 5759).
48 Bruno Latour, On Recalling Ant in John Law and John Hassard, eds., Actor Network Theory and
After (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1999), p. 19.
49 Michel Callon, Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation: Domestication of the Scallops and the
Fishermen of St. Brieuc Bay in John Law, ed., Power, Action and Belief: A New Sociology of Knowl-
edge (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 197233; Bruno Latour, Visualization and Cognition: Think-
ing with Eyes and Hands, Knowledge and Society: Studies in the Sociology of Culture Past and
Present, vol. 6 (1986), pp. 140; John Law, Introduction: Monsters, Machines and Sociotechnical
Relations in Law, ed., A Sociology of Monsters: Essays on Power, Technology and Domination
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der, and racial domination are epiphenomenal in relation to a more funda-
mental class domination, but rather that projects to govern and administer
class in the field of population commonly work by a characteristic set of dis-
placements and juxtapositions.
Some Foucauldian accounts tend to envisage the social in the topographi-
cal terms to which Latour objects. In Nikolas Roses account, for instance,
the social is treated primarily as a space of disciplinary enclosures where
elements of population are grouped together and subjected to various forms
of treatment.50 For such accounts, the mobility of the social is limited to
changes in its location on a liberal governmental map: the mix of public and
private provision of services, for instance, varies historically. Actor-network
theory would suggest rather that the social be analysed as a circuit of knowl-
edge production and practical intervention, of representations and practices
that institutionalize representations, of abstractions that guide actions that
produce problems, and so on. The argument here is closely related to the
basic tenet of ethnomethodology, that the sense we have of the world as an
orderly place is a product of the activities we engage in to sustain that sense.
One leading methodological injunction is that we should attend to the messy,
variegated, ongoing, local recursive practices out of which apparently stable
structures are constituted.51
To argue that the social is a mobile abstraction that has no existence apart
from the practices, instruments, and devices that materialize it (including
governmental policy and administrative organization) is to circumvent, if not
simply to reject, a correspondence theory of the relation between representa-
tion and reality. John Law and John Whittaker argue that representational
practices and the devices that do the work of representation are inherently
political in the sense that they allow the few to take the place of the many.
The work of representation, in science as in government, is a double work of
speaking and silencing, a work of translation. Law and Whittaker suggest
there are at least five modes of visual representation employed in scientific
practice: reference to another text, which attempts to bolster the authority of
a present text by appeals to established texts; a rhetoric of argument, in which
visual material is placed in a mutually reinforcing relation with text; tech-
niques of quantification, which suppress variation and merge objects into
more docile forms; photographic realism, which claims to present things as
don: Routledge, 1991), pp. 123, and After Ant: Complexity, Naming and Topology in John Law
and John Hassard, eds., Actor Network Theory and After (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Sociological
Review Monograph, 1999), pp. 114; Pierre Bourdieu, Science de la science et réflexivité. Cours du
Collège de France, 2000–2001 (Paris: Éditions Raisons dAgir, 2001).
50 Rose, Powers of Freedom, especially chap. 3. For instance, Rose approvingly quotes Deleuze:  the
social refers to a particular sector, in which quite diverse problems and special cases can be grouped
together...  (p. 101).
51 Michael Lynch, Scientific Practice and Ordinary Action: Ethnomethodology and Social Studies of
Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
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they really are but which also selects and renders docile; and finally what
they treat as visual representation proper, like the diagram or graph or table,
that uses particulars as exemplars of general classes of objects and manipu-
lates them to establish relations among them.52
Representations mingle in effective ways with objects of intervention.
Representational devices, instruments, and practices have their own histo-
ries. They emerge in particular contexts but migrate to others; their technical
potential, practical utility, and aesthetic appeal vary. This is true even of the
supposedly more realistic modes of representation such as photography.
Lewis Hines innovative use of photomontage in Survey Graphic increased
the impact of the early twentieth-century American campaign against child
labour. Yet, in the nineteenth-century popular press, the displacement of
illustrations based on artists conceptions by photogravure sharply limited
the extent to which readers could be present at the scene of some events. Its
detailed, context-bound specificity, which is the foundation of claims for the
realism of photography, makes photographic representation less useful than
stylized drawing in cases where practices have to be generalized to a variety
of contexts.53
One interest of contributors to this collection is to investigate deploy-
ments of such things as the questionnaire, the interview, the survey, and
inspectoral practice. Such devices and instruments are shaped by struggles
surrounding what it means to know something and which individuals and
groups can lay claim to knowledge. Once stabilized, however, these devices
and instruments become detachable from their own conditions of emergence
and may come to serve a variety of purposes. As Mary Poovey notes, for
instance, the growing epistemological prestige of numerical representation
from the seventeenth century encouraged gestural mathematics as a tactic
in political and economic debate. Numbers would be invoked without any-
one having done the work of counting anything. Or, perhaps, stray objects
would be counted and the numerical presentation of them would be sup-
posed to signify simply by virtue of its numerical character. The relation
between instruments and knowledge-producing practices is complex, and
social science can be scientistic without being scientific. Techniques and
devices may be mobilized ritualistically or symbolically; arguments and
52 John Law and John Whittaker, On the Art of Representation: Notes on the Politics of Visualisation
in Gordon Fyfe and John Law, eds., Picturing Power: Visual Depiction and Social Relations (Lon-
don: Routledge, Sociological Review Monograph 35, 1988), pp. 160183.
53 John Law and Michael Lynch, Lists, Field Guides, and the Descriptive Organization of Seeing: Bird-
watching as an Exemplary Observational Activity in Michael Lynch and Steve Woolgar, eds., Repre-
sentation in Scientific Practice (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990), pp. 267299. There is an
excellent exhibition catalogue entitled America and Lewis Hine: Photographs, 1904–1940 (Miller-
ton, N.Y.: Aperture Inc., 1977). Michèle Martins work in progress on the nineteenth-century illus-
trated press shows that the displacement of engraving by photography meant, among other things,
that readers could no longer see crimes in progress, but had to be content with crime scenes after the
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claims may seek a patina of scientific respectability by adopting certain rep-
resentational modes.54
I suggest that histories of the social should indeed attend to the myriad
messy, local practices of organization, investigation, and meaning-making
which come to form the infrastructural supports for the existence of social
objects. Techniques of investigation, forms and practices of representation,
attempts to group together and to standardize activities and accounts of them
are essential elements of the construction of the social. Knowledge of how
the social is produced will obviously encourage reflection on alternative
methods of construction. Yet dissolving the social and society into knowl-
edge techniques and strategies of representation seriously limits realist
attempts to grasp effects of structure. It sharply limits (if not simply dis-
counts) the possibilities for the production of objective knowledge, and hence
calls into question the possibility of sociology and social history as truthful
discourses. Showing that knowledge depends on knowledge production prac-
tices may tempt one to adopt a radical relativist position.
Some deconstructionist work explicitly encourages the elimination of
society as an object that can do work of explanation. Such is the thrust of
adopting the move that Ann Game has described as undoing the social, and
perhaps Latours analysis of the modern constitution of knowledge could
be read in this way, too.55 Both strategies remove the social and society as
explanatory instruments and encourage interrogations about the object of
knowledge claimed for social history and for sociology, the logos of the
social. Game has argued that sociologys typical self-representation is that
its distinctive concern is with the representation of the social: it is a social sci-
ence (and a social science). Game suggests that the sociological fiction is
that it is not fiction. To put this another way, the sociological fiction is that it
is possible for the subject of sociological knowledge to know the object, the
social. Definition as a science avoids the issue of how meaning is produced in
the discipline.56
Directed at either a sociology or a social history that would claim to base
itself on a perfectly transparent relation between the subject and object of
knowledge, or at a functionalist analysis that would see society as an actor
possessed of will and intention, such deconstructionist critique is helpful. It
has less purchase on reflexive versions of sociology and social history.
These recognize the conventional nature of the claims of science to truth.
They situate the subjects of knowledge in discursive fields. They are atten-
tive to the construction of objects of knowledge. Yet they insist on the limit-
54 Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact, p. 185; Joel Best, Damned Lies and Statistics: Untangling
Numbers from the Media, Politicians, and Activists (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).
55 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge Mass: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1993).
56 Game, Undoing the Social, p. 38.
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ing and enabling effects of the structure of social relations. Such histories
and sociologies both interrogate and operate their concepts.
Social history and sociology, as Pierre Bourdieu has remarked, are con-
demned to be controversial because they have not managed to establish the
conditions of the production of scientific knowledge in which the real, as
constructed conventionally with the available instrumentation, can arbitrate
disputes. Not only is the real itself a matter of dispute, but the lack of
widely shared truth conventions means that it is acceptable for some sociolo-
gists and social historians to practise their disciplines while claiming that no
such truth conventions are conceivable. Other practitioners attempt to justify
a one best story, but the matters on which all sociologists or social histori-
ans can agree are so limited as to be of little use.57
There is no obvious escape from such controversy, but the tension between
situated local practices and general structural effects has been and continues
to be productive. Still, as Peter Wagner has remarked, minimally, sociology
and social history need some sort of concept of society or the social as
the representation of the state of social relations. Investigating the prac-
tices, instruments, and devices involved in the making of the social in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Europe and America offers insight into
the ways this object has been constructed, materialized, and made objective.
We might also heed Wagners warning: If society is currently out of fash-
ion without being superseded by a more appropriate concept, this means that
a political sociology that conflated issues in conceptual shortcuts has been
replaced on the one hand by a return to a sociologically ill informed political
philosophy, and on the other by a sociology that is blind to political issues.58
My own position is that the social and society are inherently political
objects, and in a double sense. Their construction and use depend upon the
establishment and realization or enforcement of practical equivalences. The
fact of equation and the choice of objects of equation are matters of political
power. Again, the identification of effects of structure points to the existence
of a domain of common concern, in which individual variation is juxtaposed
to regular relations. The tension between the two remains the common
object of sociology and social history.
57 Bourdieu, Science de la science; Timothy Stanley, Why I Killed Canadian History: Conditions for an
Anti-Racist History in Canada, Histoire sociale/ Social History, vol. 33, no. 65 (2000), pp. 79104.
58 Wagner,  An Entirely New Object of Consciousness, of Volition, of Thought .
